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Cognitive bias modification is a potential low-intensity
intervention for mood disorders, but previous studies have
shown mixed success. This study explored whether facial
interpretation bias modification (FIBM), a similar paradigm
designed to shift emotional interpretation (and/or perception)
of faces would transfer to: (i) self-reported symptoms and
(ii) a battery of cognitive tasks. In a preregistered, double-
blind randomized controlled trial, healthy participants received
eight online sessions of FIBM (N= 52) or eight sham sessions
(N= 52). While we replicate that FIBM successfully shifts
ambiguous facial expression interpretation in the intervention
group, this failed to transfer to the majority of self-report or
cognitive measures. There was, however, weak, inconclusive
evidence of transfer to a self-report measure of stress, a
cognitive measure of anhedonia, and evidence that results were
moderated by trait anxiety (whereby transference was greatest
in those with higher baseline symptoms). We discuss the need
for work in both larger and clinical samples, while urging
caution that these FIBM training effects may not transfer to
clinically relevant domains.
2017 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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Highlights
— Facial interpretation bias modification (FIBM) was studied.
— FIBM induced a substantial positive bias, alongside no change in a control group.
— FIBM effects did not appear to transfer to the majority of outcome measures.
— Inconclusive evidence of transfer to measures of stress response and anhedonia.
— This FIBM task may not be an efficacious intervention in affective disorders.
1. Introduction
Although a number of proven psychological and pharmacological treatments for mood disorders are
available, worldwide, access to these treatments remains limited. In the UK, for instance, public treatment
for depression is plagued by wait lists, high costs or side effects [1], and treatments indicate response
rates of only around 50% [1,2]. Thus, there is a need for effective interventions that are inexpensive, quick
and easy to deliver. It is here that cognitive bias modification (CBM) may hold promise. CBM generally
consists of a short task that serves to train individuals to shift towards (a positive) or away from (a
negative) cognitive processing bias [3]. Negative cognitive biases are associated with the tendency to
attend to and interpret ambiguous or neutral information in a negative manner. Such biases are thought
to be critical to the onset, maintenance and recurrence of anxiety disorders and depression (e.g. [4–13]).
A meta-analysis of previous work has also argued for a relationship between negative cognitive biases
and past, current and future depressive symptoms [14]. The emerging field of CBM posits that through
the modification of these biases it may be possible to intervene prior to the onset of depression or prevent
the risk of subsequent depressive episodes for individuals in remission [15].
A newly developed CBM task design (described here as FIBM) that targets the interpretation (and/or
perception) of emotional facial expressions (happy versus sad) via an online training procedure [16]
represents a promising candidate. The ability to recognize and comprehend emotion in facial expressions
is critical for social functioning and is disrupted in depression (e.g. [17]), but is also relevant to the non-
depressed population (e.g. interpreting ambiguous facial expressions as negative rather than positive
will have a negative impact on one’s mood regardless of the presence of an affective disorder; e.g. [9,10]).
Although the misinterpretation of facial expressions has been shown in social anxiety [18], this FIBM
task focuses on inducing a positive bias for happy versus sad faces relevant to depression (e.g. compared
with happy versus threatening faces, which might be used in a comparable paradigm for anxiety). A
number of studies have shown that it is possible to shift cognitive biases (and induce positive changes in
mood) in both healthy (e.g. [19]) and dysphoric individuals (which often goes undiagnosed [20]). Indeed,
using this FIBM task, Penton-Voak et al. [21] showed increased perception of happiness (versus sadness)
in ambiguous facial expressions, which was retained for at least two weeks, as well as some evidence for
increased positive affect in healthy adults, and Dalili et al. [22] showed that the task generalizes to non-
trained facial stimuli. In theory, a positive bias in the perception of ambiguous emotional expressions
should lead an individual towards a more favourable assessment of daily social interactions, and this
positive framework (or ‘schemata’, [23]) should ultimately carry over into their mood and other areas of
cognition across both healthy and patient populations (e.g. [13,24]). However, these more comprehensive
‘transfer’ effects for reducing depressive symptoms have yet to be extensively studied.
Previous studies on the therapeutic effects of CBM, which can be used to target attentional (attention
bias modification, ABM) or interpretive (interpretation bias modification, IBM) cognitive biases, have
been mixed. Clinical studies on depression are limited but have shown ABM to be an effective tool
for reducing negative biases and the risk of recurrence in patients with remitted depression [15], and
both ABM [25,26] and IBM [27,28] to reduce symptoms in individuals with sub-threshold depression.
Following two weeks of ABM, Yang et al. [13] also reported symptom reduction in individuals with
moderate–severe depression, which was maintained at three- and seven-month follow-up, and Beevers et
al. [24] found that both placebo and active CBM lead to similar depression reductions over the course of a
one-month period with some evidence of transfer effects to other cognitive processes. However, Everaert
et al. [29] found that single-session dot-probe training similar to that used in the clinical studies did
not successfully modify attentional biases or transfer to an interpretation bias task. Meta-analyses of the
clinical efficacy of both ABM and IBM in depression have also failed to show clear evidence of changes in
depressive symptomatology [30–33], though there is presently a much larger body of work considering
ABM. Many of these reviews criticize the current body of CBM research for showing small effects of bias
modification, running training over too few sessions (e.g. insufficient training ‘dose’), and neglecting to
look at transfer effects. Our present study aims to address these shortfalls in assessment of our novel
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intervention through comprehensive, well-powered tests of transfer effects using a preregistered design
that limits analytical flexibility and post hoc hypothesizing.
We had three specific aims. Firstly, we aimed to replicate findings by Penton-Voak et al. [21] in order to
evaluate the efficacy of this FIBM task in inducing a positive cognitive bias. As outlined above, altering
negative cognitive biases may be critical in treating affective disorders yet the clinical potential of CBM
remains unclear. There is a long literature showing the misinterpretation of faces in depression (as well
as other mood and anxiety disorders, e.g. [11,18,34]), which this FIBM task specifically targets. Moreover,
this task is inexpensive, as well as quicker and easier (simple to use by virtue of only requiring a single
choice, not dependent on reaction time and can be completed online) than many bias modification
alternatives. Given this, we chose to assess this FIBM task in a healthy sample as proof of concept. Studies
such as these are imperative for understanding a technique’s potential prior to considering it in a clinical
population. Secondly, we aimed to evaluate the efficacy of this FIBM task to improve subjective mood
symptoms. Thirdly, we aimed to assess the ability of FIBM to transfer to a battery of cognitive tasks,
including a dot-probe task commonly used in CBM studies [35], as well as validated cognitive measures
of anhedonia [36] and stress reactivity [37]. The latter was adopted because it may be that cognitive biases
are most prominent when the individual is under stress (e.g. [23]). If an intervention claims to have an
effect on mood, it should also successfully shift to these other measures, which have also been argued
to index mood state [35–37]. Our design, hypotheses and statistical analyses were registered online prior
to data collection.1 We predicted that the double-blind randomized controlled FIBM would induce a
positive bias in the intervention group, whereas there would be no change in a control (sham-FIBM)
group. Critically, we also predicted that training effects would generalize across a battery of self-report
and cognitive processing outcome measures.
2. Methods
2.1. Sample screening
All participants (recruited from the UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience subject database) had
normal or corrected-to-normal (glasses/contact lenses) colour vision, English as their first language and
the ability to give written informed consent. Screening included the exclusion of individuals currently
receiving treatment for depression or anxiety, with serious medical conditions, known psychiatric or
neurological disorders, or recent engagement in drug/heavy alcohol use. All participants provided
written informed consent before taking part in the study (UCL ethics reference: 1764/001) and were
compensated £30 for their time.
2.2. Facial interpretation bias modification
2.2.1. Task structure
Each FIBM session [16] comprised three phases (baseline, training and test), during which participants
categorized facial expressions in a two-alternative forced choice procedure.2 In each trial participants
were presented with an emotional face stimulus (1/15; figure 1a) which was a morph image of two
emotions (happy or sad exemplars). The face pictures were morphed from several faces and were
licensed from Cambridge Cognition. Participants were required to decide whether the face presented
was ‘happy’ or ‘sad’ before moving to the next face.
In the baseline phase, participants did not receive feedback (they were not told if they were correct
or not) in order to assess individually tailored balance points, described as the point in which they
were equally likely to perceive happy or sad. Balance points were used to establish the success of the
procedure in modifying the perception of ambiguous emotional expressions [21]. The baseline balance
point was estimated at the end of the first block using the formula: ([number of faces categorized
as happy/45]× 15), rounded to an integer. This was then used to tailor personal feedback to each
participant in the training phase. In the intervention arm, participants were given feedback using a
balance point shifted two places from their baseline (e.g. if their baseline balance point was 6, they were
trained to 8). In the placebo arm participants were simply trained to reinforce their own balance point
(e.g. if their baseline was 6, they were trained to 6). Finally, the test phase (identical to the baseline phase)
1Protocol for the current study: https://osf.io/65a4y/.
2A demonstration version of the cognitive bias modification task can be seen at: https://bertmichael.firebaseapp.com/.
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Figure 1. Task schematics. (a) Bias modification happy face morph (faces 3–5 on 15 face positive-neutral to negative-neutral spectrum)
and a sad face (face 12). (b) Example biasmodification trial with feedback (correct/incorrect window; in the training phase only). Baseline
and test phases follow the identical structure but do not provide feedback. (c) Example of a successful hard task selection in EEfRT task.
(d) Two words differing in emotional valence (threat/neutral) were presented simultaneously (500 ms), followed by a probe (> or<)
that replaced either I. the neutral word or II. the threat word. (e) Participants pressed the space bar as quickly as possible in response to
frequent ‘go’ stimuli (‘= ’) and inhibited their response to infrequent ‘no-go’ stimuli (O).
measured whether training had changed the interpretation of the emotional face stimuli. The baseline
and test comprised 45 trials each, where every face in the morph sequence was presented three times and
in a random order. The training phase comprised 30 trials with each face presented two times (figure 1b).
The primary outcome was the balance point at the baseline phase. The training procedure itself was
identical to that used in Penton-Voak et al. [21].
 on January 5, 2018http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
5rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:170681
................................................
2.3. Self-report outcome measures
Five self-report outcome measures were recorded. The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; [38])
measured depressive symptoms, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; [39]) measured state and trait
anxiety, the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; [40]) measured current affective state, the Daily
Stress Inventory (DSI; [41]) assessed stress caused by daily events (e.g. ‘waited longer than you wanted’)
in the past 24 h, and the Ambiguous Interpretation of Emotional Outcomes (AIEO; [42]) measured
emotional interpretational biases. Outcome measures for the DSI comprised frequency, which refers to
the number of events reported to have occurred in the past 24 h, and average impact rating (AIR), which
refers to sum of the stress ratings attributed to these events divided by the frequency.
2.4. Cognitive processing outcome measures
2.4.1. Effort-expenditure for rewards task
The effort-expenditure for rewards task (EEfRT) [36], which tests physical effort and motivation for
hypothetical monetary rewards, was used as it has been shown to measure anhedonia [36]. In each
trial, participants were given the choice between an ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ task, each of which required
different amounts of fast-paced manual key pressing. The easy task required fewer key presses with
the participant’s dominant index finger while the hard task required more key presses with their non-
dominant little finger. Participants first completed three ‘hard task’ calibrations, where they were given
21 s to make as many key presses as possible (to fill a bar on the screen). Practice and real trials that
followed were calibrated and presented to all participants in the same randomized order. To successfully
complete the hard task, participants were required to complete 85% of the key presses made during the
calibration in 21 s while the easy task required 33% of calibrated key presses in 7 s. The (hypothetical)
reward for the easy task was fixed at $1.00, while the reward for the hard task varied between $1.24
and $4.00. As monetary rewards were not guaranteed, a probability cue (12%, 50% or 88%) was given,
referring to the likelihood that they would receive a reward if they completed the trial successfully. If the
hard task was not chosen during the choice presentation (5 s), the easy task was automatically selected
(see figure 1c for trial example). Participants played the task for 20 min with no maximum number of
trials. The primary outcome measure for this task was the proportion of hard trials chosen.
2.4.2. Emotional dot probe
This task was adopted as a common benchmark in CBM studies [32,43], as it is thought to measure
differences in selective attention and response to emotional stimuli [35]. Participants were asked to
identify the orientation of a non-emotional probe (> or <) from one of two spatial locations on a screen.
Before the probe was presented, participants were briefly (500 ms) shown two words, which appeared
simultaneously on the screen and differed in emotional valence (threat or neutral). Thirty-four pairs of
threat/neutral stimuli were presented twice, once where the probe replaced the neutral word and again
where it replaced the threat word, comprising 68 trials (figure 1d for a schematic). A threat bias score (the
difference in the mean RT/accuracy to the probe following threat versus neutral stimuli priming) was
calculated as the primary outcome measure.
2.4.3. Stress-sustained attention to response task
This task was adopted as a reliable measure of individual stress response [37]. The use of a sustained
attention task within a stress reactivity manipulation has been shown to specifically improve the ability
to withhold the infrequent ‘no-go’ responses in the task (stress-SART [44]). This task was selected in
order to measure whether the emotional effect of the modification was more evident when the individual
encountered a stressor (e.g. [23]).
2.4.4. Stress manipulation
Stress was manipulated by placing participants under threat of shock. Two electrodes were attached
to the back of participants’ non-dominant wrist (half a centimetre apart) with conductive gel and
hypoallergenic tape. A Digitimer DS5 Constant Current Stimulator (Digitimer Ltd, Welwyn Garden City,
UK) was used to generate and deliver the shocks. In order to keep the level of shocks consistent in feeling
between participants, a short work-up was carried out; the level of shock was increased until participants
rated it as ‘unpleasant but not painful’ [45], which took approximately three to five shocks. Threat blocks,
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during which participants were told they would be at risk of an unpredictable shock (non-contingent on
task performance), were counterbalanced with safe blocks, where participants were told they were safe
from unpredictable shock.
2.4.5. Task structure
Participants were asked to press the space bar as quickly as possible (using their dominant hand) in
response to frequent ‘go’ stimuli (= ), and inhibit their response to infrequent ‘no-go’ stimuli. These
stimuli were presented for 250 ms with a 1750 ms inter-stimulus interval. Eight blocks lasting 104 s were
presented (alternating between threat and safe). Each block was preceded by a 3 s cue which stated either,
‘YOU ARE NOW SAFE FROM SHOCK!’ or ‘YOU ARE NOW AT RISK OF SHOCK!’. In each testing
session, participants received a total of three shocks (not including those administered in the work-up);
one shock was sent in the first, second and fourth threat blocks. The primary outcome measure for this
task was the accuracy to ‘no-go’ stimuli (see figure 1e for a schematic representation).
2.4.6. Retrospective state manipulation check
Immediately following the stress-SART, participants filled in a subjective manipulation check. This asked
how anxious, stressed and afraid they felt in each condition (safe/threat) by selecting a number on a scale
of 1 (not at all) to 10 (very much so) and ‘Did you receive a shock?’ which they responded to with ‘Yes’
or ‘No’.
2.5. Outcome measure programming
Questionnaires, the AIEO and the emotional dot probe, recoded for online delivery, were run online
through Testable [46]. The EEfRT was run in Matlab (2014b, The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, USA). The
stress-SART task was run through the Cogent (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging and Institute
of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK) toolbox for Matlab (2014b), and the retrospective state
manipulation check was run in Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT, USA).
2.6. Procedure
See electronic supplementary material for a CONSORT summary of the study procedure. Following
enrolment, participants were randomly allocated to either the control or intervention group according
to a pre-allocated participant number. An individual (who played no role in recruitment or participant
contact) randomly assigned participant identification numbers to blinded intervention logins such that
group allocation was fully blind to both the participant and experimenter. Participants were asked to
complete the FIBM task from a desktop computer/laptop once daily (six at-home sessions in total for
which they received reminder emails at 08.00) in between in-laboratory sessions at baseline (before FIBM)
and post-training (immediately after the final session of FIBM).
2.7. Statistical analyses
2.7.1. Power calculation
A priori power analysis was run in G×Power [47]. This analysis was based on an effect size obtained
after a six-week follow-up on FIBM training; d= 1.12 (M Munafò 2015, personal communication). In our
determination, 50% of this value was calculated (i.e. d= 0.56) in order to provide a conservative estimate
for the transfer effect. These data determined that we would require a sample size of 104, split evenly
between intervention and control groups, to achieve 80% power at an α level of 5% (two-tailed).
2.7.2. Frequentist analysis
Frequentist statistics were computed in SPSS v. 22 (IBM Crop, Armonk, NY, USA). For all measures,
frequentist repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) models were performed to compute
F-statistics, p-values and effect sizes. For all analyses, our primary outcome of interest was the omnibus
interaction.
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2.7.3. Bayesian analysis
Bayesian analyses were run in JASP [48], using the default prior, as the addition of these analyses enabled
acceptance/rejection of the experimental/null hypothesis. It also enabled assessment of the relative
strength of a given hypothesis. The best model for describing the data was defined as the model with the
largest BF10. Models with a BF10 greater than 1 were favoured over the null model. In order to calculate
whether a model including the interaction between group and time was better than a model including
only time (as many measures show large repetition effects that are unrelated to our manipulation), the
BF10 of the group× time model was divided by the BF10 of the time model so that resulting BF values
greater than 1 favoured the group× time model. BF values were interpreted as either anecdotal (0–3),
substantial (3–10), strong (10–30), very strong (30–100) or decisive (greater than 100; [49–51]). BF10 values
below zero were taken as evidence for the null, with interpretation proceeding along the same lines
but for the 1/BF10 values (e.g. 3 : 10 is substantial evidence for the model, so 1/3 : 1/10= 0.3 : 0.1 was
substantial evidence for the null). Data are available for download (https://osf.io/7uzwx/).
3. Results
3.1. Participants
We screened N= 111 participants, but seven were excluded due to dropout after the baseline session of
the experiment (N= 5 in intervention group). Final participants comprised N= 104, of which N= 52 (35
female, 17 male; mean age= 24.06, s.d.= 5.13; N= 47 right handed) were allocated to the intervention
condition and N= 52 (38 female, 14 male; mean age= 24.88, s.d.= 6.25, N= 49 right handed) were
allocated to the control condition.
3.2. Facial interpretation bias modification
Within our total sample the mean baseline balance point was 7.52 (s.d.= 1.44). There were six participants
with a pre-existing strong positive bias (one participant with 11 and five participants with 10 as their
baseline balance point).
We were able to replicate Penton-Voak et al.’s [21] findings; the modification successfully induced
a positivity bias in the intervention group and not in the control group (time: F= 18.62, p< 0.001,
η2= 0.232; group× time: F= 17.62, p< 0.001, η2= 0.22; figure 2). The model including the group× time
interaction (BF10= 9.875× 1031) was decisively better (BF10= 5.14× 1020) than a model which only
included time (BF10= 1.921× 1011) so we can accept the hypothesis that the intervention shifted bias
over time relative to the control.
3.3. Self-report outcome measures
Scores (table 1a) did not differ substantially between groups over time for the BDI, STAI, PANAS or
AIEO (see electronic supplementary material, table S1 for means and standard deviations). Bayes factor
analysis revealed all models including the group× time interaction (barring the DSI (AIR)) to be worse
than the model of time; we can, therefore, accept the null hypothesis that FIBM did not have an effect
on the BDI, STAI, PANAS, AIEO or DSI (frequency). Notably, however, we did see clear evidence of
a group× time interaction in the DSI (AIR) (p= 0.028). Simple effects show that this was driven by
a change over time in the intervention (F1,101= 16.99, p< 0.001), but not control groups (F1,101= 0.087,
p= 0.352), which resulted in weak evidence of group differences at post-training (F1,101= 3.25, p= 0.074)
but no clear evidence of differences at baseline (F1,101= 0.11, p= 0.744; figure 3). Moreover, there was no
comparable effect on DSI (frequency), indicating that FIBM induced an interpretation bias, not a detection
bias. However, the Bayesian analysis showed that this interaction effect was only marginally better than
a model with a main effect of time (BF= 1.01), so this is an inconclusive effect that warrants replication.
3.4. Cognitive processing outcome measures
As highlighted in table 1b, scores did not differ substantially between groups over time for the dot
probe, stress-SART or EEfRT (see electronic supplementary material, table S1 for means and standard
deviations). However, there was weak evidence in frequentist analyses of the EEfRT data. Simple effects
show that this was driven by changes in both groups over time, albeit with weaker evidence for change
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Figure 2. Mean baseline phase balance point for intervention and control participants across eight FIBM sessions. Error bars indicate
standard error of the mean (s.e.m.).
in the intervention group (control: F1,101= 22.76, p< 0.001; intervention: F1,101= 4.14, p= 0.045). There
was also a numerically smaller decrease in the proportion of hard trials (versus easy trials) chosen by the
intervention group (group differences not significant at baseline (F1,101= 0.02, p= 0.88) or post-training
(F1,101= 0.9, p= 0.344)). Bayes factor analysis revealed the time model as the winning model, however,
this was only 2.31 times better than the group× time interaction model indicating no definitive evidence
in favour of either model.
Exploratory post hoc analysis: The effect of baseline trait anxiety and BDI on the omnibus interaction or
FIBM across training for the intervention group, and the effect of baseline balance point and the omnibus
interaction for the intervention group.
As participants were recruited from a healthy sample, it was possible that those in the intervention
group already had a positive bias and so FIBM could not push them further. In order to see whether
the effect of the manipulation was modulated by individual differences in baseline depression or
anxiety symptoms, baseline BDI (intervention: M= 9.08, s.d.= 7.73, range= 30; control: M= 9, s.d.= 7.99,
range= 34) and trait anxiety (intervention: M= 49.31, s.d.= 3.69, range= 17; control: M= 50.48, s.d.= 4.2,
range= 18) were added as a covariate to omnibus interactions of interest for the FIBM group and then
broken down into constituent correlations. There was strong evidence that the effect of the manipulation
interacted with trait anxiety for the stress-SART (time× threat× trait anxiety interaction, F1,48= 7.322,
p= 0.009). This was driven by reduced stress-potentiated inhibition following FIBM only in those with
higher trait anxiety (figure 3c, r=−0.365, N= 52, p= 0.008). This suggests that FIBM only reduced
cognitive measures of negative affect in those with higher levels of trait anxiety (indeed, it may have had
the opposite effect in those with low trait anxiety), providing evidence that these results were moderated
by trait anxiety. There was no clear evidence of an interaction between the BDI and any outcome measure
(all p> 0.229).
In a second post hoc analysis, we explored possible correlations between the first acquired balance
point and the manipulation on our effects of interest (calculated as a baseline subtracted from post-
training contrast). There was a marginally non-significant correlation between the balance point at
baseline and state anxiety ratings over time (r=−0.272, N= 52, p= 0.051) in the intervention group,
whereby those with a lower balance point at baseline (i.e. higher negative bias) showed a greater
reduction in state anxiety post-training. This was not shown in the sham group (r= 0.011, N= 52,
p= 0.942); however, the difference between the intervention and sham slopes was not significant
(p= 0.149). There was no time×BP interaction in any of the other variables of interest (all p> 0.115).
4. Discussion
This study sought to (i) validate a novel FIBM paradigm, as well as (ii) explore transfer effects to self-
report measures and cognitive processes in a healthy sample. In accordance with our first hypothesis,
FIBM successfully induced (and replicated) a substantial positive bias in the intervention group,
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Figure 3. The simple effects across baseline and post-training for (a) Daily Stress Inventory (DSI) average impact rating. (b) DSI frequency
measure. Error bars represent s.e.m. (c) Correlations between stress-SART threat-potentiated (threat conditionminus safe condition) shift
(time 2 minus time 1) and baseline trait anxiety in the FIBM group.
alongside no significant change in the control group. However, counter to our hypotheses, FIBM failed
to transfer to the majority of outcome measures. Indeed, Bayesian analyses enabled us to accept the null
hypothesis that FIBM had no effect on most measures. Nevertheless, for two measures, one self-report
measure of stress impact and one cognitive measure of anhedonia, FIBM showed inconclusive effects
that were in the predicted direction.
FIBM did not influence most self-report measures (BDI, STAI, PANAS, DSI (frequency) or AIEO
score) at follow-up. This contrasts with a number of previous findings showing CBM-induced changes in
mood using different techniques (e.g. [25,26,52]), though is similar to meta-analytic results considering
alternative CBM tasks [31–33]. There was weak evidence of omnibus interaction for the DSI AIR measure,
suggesting that post-FIBM daily events were perceived as less stressful. While it should be noted that
this effect would not withstand correction for the multiple comparisons used in this paper, the Bayesian
analyses, for which multiple comparison correction is less of an issue, do nevertheless provide weak
evidence in favour of this effect. There was also some evidence for a correlation between the first acquired
FIBM balance points and state anxiety over time, indicating that those in the intervention group with a
lower balance point at baseline (i.e. higher negative bias) showed a greater reduction in state anxiety
post-training (which was not shown in the sham group). This provides some evidence for the efficacy of
the paradigm; however, the difference between the intervention and sham slopes was not significant, so
strong inferences should not be drawn.
The dot probe is a common paradigm in CBM research [3], but transfer effects were not apparent in
this study. Moreover, the dot probe showed a significant main effect of time indicating poor reliability
over multiple testing sessions (e.g. [53]). This unreliability might plausibly explain the mixed positive
and null FIBM findings using the dot-probe paradigm with repeated measures designs. In future,
exploring alternative outcomes for the dot probe which have better reliability than traditional scores
may be useful (e.g. calculating trial level bias scores [54]). In line with well-replicated findings, we
found a difference in accuracy while under threat versus safe in the stress-SART, though this did not
also differ between groups. The EEfRT has previously shown differences between individuals with
anhedonia and healthy controls [36] and although there was a hint towards a similar effect of decreased
anhedonia post-FIBM, this was seen alongside changes in both groups over time and evidence for the
effect was inconclusive.
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This proof of concept study only considered effects in healthy individuals. Although, as such
individuals are clearly amenable to training, and may indeed possess sub-threshold symptoms, we also
explored the possibility that results were moderated by symptoms in some individuals. An interaction
with baseline trait anxiety was seen in the Stress-SART, indicating that transfer effects were observed in
higher anxiety individuals only. The lack of a transfer effect to the Stress-SART may therefore be a result
of the healthy sample used in this study. Notably this task was not among those in which a weak effect
was observed, although the clear shift in biases on the training task suggests that our whole sample was
amenable to FIBM. Future work in clinical populations will help disambiguate this. In fact, a reasonable
parallel to the effects observed in this study may be working memory training, which does not transfer
well to untrained cognitive operations in healthy samples [55], but shows promise as a tool for general
cognitive improvement in impaired populations (e.g. [56,57]).
Further research is also needed to clarify the tentative self-report stress and cognitive effort effects
observed here. One possibility, for example, is that this paper is underpowered to detect transfer effects.
We powered the study for 50% of the effect size of the modification effect, and indeed, comprehensively
replicated this effect. However, any effect size of transference to both cognitive and self-report measures
is unknown. Given the complexity of any mechanism by which a computerized training task could shift
perception of faces and then influence behaviour, it seems highly plausible that the transference effect
size is considerably smaller than 50% of the training effect. As such, future work in a larger sample is
warranted. One counter-argument to this is that if the effects are so small that they require large samples
to detect then they are likely to be too small to be meaningful. However, at a population level even
tiny effects can be meaningful (e.g. small effects in cancer intervention studies which may translate to
meaningful impact at the population level [58]). Given the large impact and cost of mood disorders on
the one hand, and the relatively low cost of providing FIBM training on the other, clarifying whether
even small effects exist is probably worthwhile.
Another explanation for our lack of effects is that while one week was sufficient to induce a change in
bias, it may not be long enough to observe corresponding changes in mood. For instance, improvements
in mood may only occur as the individual learns how to interact with and respond to the world within
the new, more positive cognitive framework [59] and this process takes longer than a week. However,
counter to this argument is that Munafò et al. (2016, personal communication) showed no effects on
some measures of mood at six-week follow-up. Although a substantial FIBM effect was observed, it is
possible that training at home (versus in laboratory) may have affected the strength of effects. It may
also be that the tasks selected in this study were too far removed from the process of disambiguating
facial expressions. We chose these tasks, which have been shown to be disrupted in depression, precisely
because they are so different. Specifically, if transfer of effects occurs then it should shift other processes
that are sensitive to depression. However, perhaps tasks closer to the underlying process being targeted
would be more successful. In fact, it may be that, as face perception is disrupted in social anxiety [18],
we may have seen transfer to measures related to social anxiety as opposed to depression. Another
possibility is that FIBM will not transfer to any of the measures because the balance point shift in the
intervention group is driven by a generic learning effect. As training was executed by giving participants
correct/incorrect feedback, it is possible that participants were simply learning the ‘correct’ answer
rather than actually changing their interpretation. Our observed weak effects in the right direction argue
against this possibility, as does prior evidence of transfer to unlearned faces [22], but it is nevertheless
worth considering if these effects fail to replicate. Finally, it should be noted that this FIBM task has been
shown to transfer to other tasks measuring facial interpretation [22]. We did not attempt to replicate this
effect here, as we were interested in transfer to other, clinically meaningful tasks. However, in retrospect
replication of this effect in this sample would have been a valuable positive control.
Overall, the results of this study suggest that the clinical potential of this FIBM technique should be
approached with caution. Our study contributes to a body of findings that have failed to show clear
positive effects of multi-session FIBM on symptoms of mood and anxiety disorders (e.g. [30,32,33]).
Specifically, we add to these findings by largely showing no transfer effects to some measures of common
self-reported mood disorder symptoms and a battery of cognitive processing measures, which have
previously been associated with anhedonia [36] and stress response [44]. Although previous studies have
been criticized for their failure to show effects due to a small effect of CBM [14], this study has shown a
lack of transfer effects despite a substantial bias modification in a healthy sample. Unless the weak effects
in this paper replicate in larger, clinical samples, we posit that the FIBM task considered may not be an
efficacious intervention in affective disorders.
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